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MIMO Beamforming for Secure and
Energy-Efficient Wireless Communication
Nguyen T. Nghia1, Hoang D. Tuan1, Trung Q. Duong2 and H. Vincent Poor3
Abstract
Considering a multiple-user multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) channel with an eavesdropper,
this letter develops a beamformer design to optimize the energy efficiency in terms of secrecy bits
per Joule under secrecy quality-of-service constraints. This is a very difficult design problem with no
available exact solution techniques. A path-following procedure, which iteratively improves its feasible
points by using a simple quadratic program of moderate dimension, is proposed. Under any fixed
computational tolerance the procedure terminates after finitely many iterations, yielding at least a locally
optimal solution. Simulation results show the superior performance of the obtained algorithm over other
existing methods.
Index Terms
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I. INTRODUCTION
Secure communication achieved by exploiting the wireless physical layer to provide secrecy in
data transmission, has drawn significant recent research attention (see e.g. [1]–[3] and references
therein). The performance of this type of secure communication can be measured in terms of the
secrecy throughput, which is the capacity of conveying information to the intended users while
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2keeping it confidential from eavesdroppers [2], [4]. On the other hand, energy efficiency (EE) has
emerged as another important figure-of-merit in assessing the performance of communication
systems [5], [6]. For most systems, both security and energy efficiency are of interest, and thus
it is of interest to combine these two metrics into a single performance index called the secrecy
EE (SEE), which can be expressed in terms of secrecy bits per Joule.
Transmit beamforming can be used to enhance the two conflicting targets for optimizing
SEE in multiple-user multiple-input multiple-output (MU-MIMO) communications: mitigating
MU interference to maximize the users’ information throughput, and jamming eavesdroppers to
control the leakage of information. However, the current approach to treat both EE [7], [8] and
SEE [9], [10] is based on costly zero-forcing beamformers, which completely cancel the MU
interference and signals received at the eavesdroppers. The EE/SEE objective is in the form of a
ratio of a concave function and a convex function, which can be optimized by using Dinkelbach’s
algorithm [11]. Each Dinkelbach’s iteration still requires a log-det function optimization, which
is convex but computationally quite complex. Moreover, zero-forcing beamformers are mostly
suitable for low code rate applications and are applicable to specific MIMO systems only. The
computational complexity of SEE for single-user MIMO/SISO communications as considered
in [12] and [13] is also high as each iteration still involves a difficult nonconvex optimization
problem.
This letter aims to design transmit beamformers to optimize SEE subject to per-user secrecy
quality-of-service (QoS) and transmit power constraints. The specific contributions are detailed
in the following dot-points.
• A path-following computational procedure, which invokes a simple convex quadratic pro-
gram at each iteration and converges to at least a locally optimal solution, is proposed.
The MU interference and eavesdropped signals are effectively suppressed for optimizing
the SEE. In contrast to zero-forcing beamformers, higher code rates not only result in
transmitting more concurrent data streams but also lead to much better SEE performance
in our proposed beamformer design.
• As a by-product, other important problems in secure and energy-efficient communications,
such as EE maximization subject to the secrecy level or sum secrecy throughput maximiza-
tion, which are still quite open for research, can be effectively addressed by the proposed
procedure.
3Notation. All variables are written in boldface. For illustrative purpose, f(V) is a mapping of
variable V while f(V¯ ) is the output of mapping f corresponding to a particular input V¯ . In
denotes the identity matrix of size n× n. The notation (·)H stands for the Hermitian transpose,
|A| denotes the determinant of a square matrix A, and 〈A〉 denotes its trace while (A)2 = AAH .
The inner product 〈X, Y 〉 is defined as 〈XHY 〉 and therefore the Frobenius squared norm of a
matrix X is ||X||2 = 〈XXH〉. The notation A  B (A ≻ B, respectively) means that A−B is
a positive semidefinite (definite, respectively) matrix. E[·] denotes expectation and ℜ{·} denotes
the real part of a complex number. CN (0, a) denotes a circularly-symmetric complex Gaussian
random variable with mean zero and variance a.
II. SEE FORMULATION
Consider a MIMO system consisting of D transmitters and D users indexed by 1, . . . , D.
Each transmitter j is equipped with N antennas to transmit information to its intended user j
equipped with Nr antennas. There is an eavesdropper equipped with Ne antennas, which is part
of the legitimate network [1], [4]. The channel matrices Hℓj ∈ CNr×N and Hℓe ∈ CNe×N from
transmitter ℓ to user j and to the eavesdropper, respectively, are known at the transmitters by
using the channel reciprocity, feedback and learning mechanisms [1], [4], [14], [15].
A complex-valued vector sj ∈ Cd1 contains the information transmitter j intends to convey
to user j, where E
[
sjs
H
j
]
= Id1 , and d1 ≤ N is the number of concurrent data streams. Denote
by Vj ∈ CN×d1 the complex-valued beamformer matrix for user j. The ratio d1/N is called the
code rate of Vj . For notational convenience, define D , {1, . . . , D} and V , [Vj ]j∈D.
The received signal at user j and the signal received at the eavesdropper are
yj = HjjVjsj +
∑
ℓ∈D\{j}
HℓjVℓsℓ + n˜j, (1)
ye =
D∑
j=1
HjeVjsj + n˜e, (2)
where n˜j ∈ CN (0, σ2j ) and n˜e ∈ CN (0, σ2e) are additive noises.
By (1), the rate of information fj leaked from user j (in nats) is
fj(V) = ln
∣∣INr + (Lj(Vj))2(Ψj(V) + σ2j INr)−1∣∣ , (3)
4where Lj(Vj) , HjjVj and Ψj(V) ,
∑
ℓ∈D\{j}(HℓjVℓ)
2
.
On the other hand, the wiretapped throughput for user j at the eavesdropper is
fj,e(V) , ln
∣∣INe + (Lj,e(Vj))2(Ψj,e(V) + σ2eINe)−1∣∣ , (4)
where Lj,e(Vj) , HjeVj and Ψj,e(V) ,
∑
ℓ∈D\{j}(HℓeVℓ)
2
. The secrecy throughput in trans-
mitting information sj to user j while keeping it confidential from the eavesdropper is defined
as [2], [4]
fj,s(V) , fj(V)− fj,e(V). (5)
Following [16], the consumed power for signal transmission is modelled by P tot(V) , ζP t(V)+
Pc, where P t(V) ,
∑D
j=1 ||Vj||2 is the total transmit power of the transmitters and ζ and Pc are
the reciprocal of the drain efficiency of the power amplifier and the circuit power, respectively.
Consider the following secure beamformer design to optimize the system’s energy efficiency:
max
V
1
P tot(V)
D∑
j=1
(fj(V)− fj,e(V)) s.t. (6a)
||Vj||2 ≤ Pmax, j ∈ D, (6b)
fj(V)− fj,e(V) ≥ rj , j ∈ D, (6c)
where the constraints (6b) limit the transmit power, while (6c) are the secrecy QoS constraints.
It can be seen from their definitions (3) and (4) that both throughput fj and wiretapped
throughput fj,e are very complicated functions of the beamformer variable V. The approach of
[7] and [8] (to EE) and [9] and [10] (to SEE) seeks V in the class of zero-forcing beamformers
Ψj(V) ≡ 0, j ∈ D and
∑
ℓ∈D(HℓeVℓ)
2 ≡ 0 to cancel completely all the MU interference and
wiretapped signals. Each throughput fj becomes a log-det function of only Vj . Dinkelbach’s
algorithm is then applied to compute a zero-forcing solution of (6), which requires a log-det
function optimization for each iteration. Such optimization is still computationally difficult with
no available polynomial-time solvers. Note that the feasibility of the zero-forcing constraints
imposes N ≥ Ne + d1 and D(N +Nr −Ne − 2d1) ≥ (D − 1)d1 [10]. Thus, there is not much
freedom for optimizing zero-forcing beamformers whenever N is not large.
In the next section, we will provide a completely new computational approach to (6) by
effectively enhancing its difficult objective and constraints.
5III. PATH-FOLLOWING COMPUTATIONAL PROCEDURE
By introducing a variable t satisfying the convex quadratic constraint
ζ
D∑
j=1
||Vj||2 + PBS ≤ t, (7)
the optimization problem (6) can be equivalently expressed as
max
V,t
P(V, t) , 1
t
D∑
j=1
(fj(V)− fj,e(V)) s.t. (6b), (6c). (8)
In what follows, a function h is said to be a minorant (majorant, resp.) of a function f at a
point x¯ in the definition domain dom(f) of f iff h(x¯) = f(x¯) and h(x) ≤ f(x) ∀ x ∈ dom(f)
(h(x) ≥ f(x) ∀ x ∈ dom(f), resp.) [17].
By [18], a concave quadratic minorant of the throughput function fj(V) at V (κ) , [V (κ)j ]j∈D,
which is feasible for (6b)-(6c) is
Θ
(κ)
j (V) , a
(κ)
j + 2ℜ{A(κ)j ,Lj(Vj)〉} − 〈B(κ)j ,Mj(V)〉, (9)
where Mj(V) , Ψj(V)+(Lj(Vj))2, 0 > a(κ)j , fj(V (κ))−〈(Lj(V (κ)j ))H(Ψj(V (κ))+σ2j INr)−1
Lj(V (κ)j )〉−σ2j 〈(Ψj(V (κ))+σ2j INr)−1−(Mj(V (κ))+σ2j INr)−1〉,A(κ)j , (Ψj(V (κ))+σ2j INr)−1Lj(V (κ)j )
and
0  B(κ)j , (Ψj(V (κ)) + σ2j INr)−1 − (Mj(V (κ)) + σ2j INr)−1.
To provide a minorant of the secrecy throughput fj,s (see (5)) at V (κ), the next step is to find a
majorant of the eavesdropper throughput function fj,e(V) at V (κ). Reexpressing fj,e by
ln
∣∣INe +Mj,e(V)/σ2e∣∣− ln ∣∣INe +Ψj,e(V)/σ2e∣∣ , (10)
for Mj,e(V) , Ψj,e(V) + (Lj,e(Vj))2, and applying Theorem 1 in the appendix for upper
bounding the first term and lower bounding the second term in (10) yields the following convex
quadratic majorant of fj,e at V (κ):
Θ
(κ)
j,e (V) , a
(κ)
j,e − 2
∑
ℓ∈D\{j}
ℜ{〈HℓeV (κ)ℓ VHℓ HHℓe 〉}/σ2e
+〈B(κ)j,e1,Mj,e(V)〉/σ2e + 〈B(κ)j,e2,Ψj,e(V)〉/σ2e ,
where a(κ)j,e , fj,e(V (κ)) + 〈(INe +Mj,e(V (κ))/σ2e)−1 − INe +Ψj,e(V (κ))/σ2e〉, and
0  B(κ)j,e1 , (INe +Mj,e(V (κ))/σ2e)−1,
0  B(κ)j,e2 , (σ2e)−1INe − (σ2eINe +Ψj,e(V (κ)))−1.
6A concave quadratic minorant of the secrecy throughput function fj,s at V (κ) is then
Θ
(κ)
j,s (V) = Θ
(κ)
j (V)−Θ(κ)j,e (V)
= a
(κ)
j,s +A(κ)j,s (V)− B(κ)j,s (V). (11)
Here, a(κ)j,s , a
(κ)
j +a
(κ)
j,e , A(κ)j,s (V) , 2ℜ{〈A(κ)j ,Lj(Vj)〉}+2
∑
ℓ∈D\{j}ℜ{〈HℓeV (κ)ℓ VHℓ HHℓe 〉}/σ2e ,
and B(κ)j,s (V) , 〈B(κ)j ,Mj(V)〉+ 〈B(κ)j,e1,Mj,e(V)〉+ 〈B(κ)j,e2,Ψj,e(V)〉/σ2e .
Therefore, the nonconvex secrecy QoS constraints (6c) can be innerly approximated by the
following convex quadratic constraints in the sense that the feasibility of the former is guaranteed
by the feasibility of the latter:
Θ
(κ)
j,s (V) ≥ rj , j = 1, ..., D. (12)
For good approximation, the following trust region is imposed:
A(κ)j,s (V) ≥ 0, j = 1, ..., D. (13)
By using the inequality
x
t
≥ 2
√
x(κ)
√
x
t(κ)
− x
(κ)
(t(κ))2
t ∀x > 0, x(κ) > 0, t > 0, t(κ) > 0
we obtain A(κ)j,s (V)/t ≥ ϕ(κ)j,s (V, t), for
ϕ
(κ)
j,s (V, t) , 2b
(κ)
j,s
√
A(κ)j,s (V)− c(κ)j,s t (14)
where 0 < b(κ)j,s ,
√
A(κ)j,s (V (κ))/t(κ), 0 < c(κ)j,s , (b(κ)j,s /t(κ))2, which is a concave function [17].
With regard to a(κ)j,s /t we define a concave function a
(κ)
j,s (t) as follows:
• If a(κ)j,s < 0, define a
(κ)
j,s (t) , a
(κ)
j,s /t, which is a concave function;
• If a(κ)j,s > 0, define a
(κ)
j,s (t) = a
(κ)
j,s (2/t
(κ)−t/(t(κ))2), which is a linear minorant of the convex
function a(κ)j,s /t at t(κ).
A concave minorant of Θ(κ)j,s (V)/t, which is also a minorant of (fj(V)−fj,e(V))/t at (V (κ), t(κ)),
is thus
g
(κ)
j,s (V, t) , a
(κ)
j,s (t) + ϕ
(κ)
j (Vj, t)− B(κ)j,s (V)〉/t. (15)
We now solve the nonconvex optimization problem (6) by generating the next feasible point
(V (κ+1), t(κ)) as the optimal solution of the following convex quadratic program (QP), which is
7Algorithm 1 Path-following Algorithm for SEE Optimization
Initialization: Set κ := 0, and choose a feasible point (V (0), t(0)) for (8).
κ-th iteration: Solve (16) for an optimal solution (V ∗, t∗) and set
κ := κ + 1, V (κ), t(κ)) , (V ∗, t∗) and calculate P(V (κ), t(κ)). Stop if∣∣(P(V (κ), t(κ))− P(V (κ−1)), t(κ−1)) /P(V (κ−1), t(κ−1))∣∣ ≤ ǫ.
an inner approximation [17] of the nonconvex optimization problem (8):
max
V,t
P(κ)(V, t) ,
D∑
j=1
g
(κ)
j,s (V, t)
s.t. (6b), (7), (12), (13). (16)
Note that (16) involves n = 2DNd1+1 scalar real variables and m = 2D+1 quadratic constraints
so its computational complexity is O(n2m2.5 +m3.5).
It can be seen that P(V (κ+1), t(κ+1)) ≥ P(κ)(V (κ+1), t(κ+1)) > P(κ)(V (κ), t(κ)) = P(V (κ), t(κ)) as
long as (V (κ+1), t(κ+1)) 6= (V (κ), t(κ)), i.e. (V (κ+1), t(κ+1)) is better than (V (κ), t(κ)). This means
that, once initialized from a feasible point (V (0), t(0)) for (8), the κ-th QP iteration (16) generates
a sequence {(V (κ), t(κ))} of feasible and improved points toward the nonconvex optimization
problem (8), which converges at least to a locally optimal solution of (6) [18]. Under the stopping
criterion ∣∣(P(V (κ+1), t(κ+1))−P(V (κ), t(κ))) /P(V (κ), t(κ))∣∣ ≤ ǫ
for a given tolerance ǫ > 0, the QP iterations will terminate after finitely many iterations.
The proposed path-following procedure for computational solution of the nonconvex optimiza-
tion problem (6) is summarized in Algorithm 1.
We note that a feasible initial point (V (0), t(0)) for (8) can be found by solving
max
V
min
j∈D
(fj(V)− fj,e(V))/rj s.t. (6b)
by the iterations
{
max
V
min
j∈D
Θ
(κ)
j,s (V)/rj s.t. (6b)
}
, which terminate upon reaching (fj(V (κ))−
fj,e(V
(κ)))/rj ≥ 1 ∀j ∈ D, to satisfy (6b)-(6c).
8The following problem of EE optimization under users’ throughput QoS constraints and
secrecy levels:
max
V
1
P tot(V)
D∑
j=1
fj(V) s.t. (6b),
fj(V) ≥ rj & fj,e(V) ≤ ǫ, j = 1, ..., D, (17)
where ǫ is set small enough to keep the users’ information confidential from the eavesdropper,
is simpler than (6). It can be addressed by a similar path-following procedure, which solves the
following QP at the κ−th iteration instead of (16):
max
V,t
D∑
j=1
(
a
(κ)
j /t+ 4b
(κ)
j
√
ℜ{〈A(κ)j ,Lj(Vj)〉}
−2c(κ)j t− 〈B(κ)j ,Mj(V)〉/t
)
s.t. (6b), (18a)
ℜ{〈A(κ)j ,Lj(Vj)〉} ≥ 0, j ∈ D, (18b)
Θ
(κ)
j (V) ≥ rj & Θ(κ)j,e (V) ≤ ǫ, j ∈ D, (18c)
where 0 < b(κ)j , 〈(Lj(V (κ)j ))H(Ψj(V (κ)) + σ2j INr)−1Lj(V (κ)j )〉1/2/t(κ), 0 < c(κ)j , (b(κ)j /t(κ))2
and A(κ)j and B(κ)j are defined from (9). A feasible initial point (V (0), t(0)) for (17) can be found
by solving
max
V
min
j∈D
min{fj(V)− rj , ǫ− fj,e(V)} s.t. (6b)
by the iterations
max
V
min
j∈D
min{Θ(κ)j (V)− rj, ǫ−Θ(κ)j,e (V)} s.t. (6b)},
which terminate upon reaching fj(V (κ)) − rj ≥ 0, ǫ − fj,e(V (κ)) ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ D, to satisfy (6b),
(17).
Lastly, the problem of sum secrecy throughput maximization
max
V
D∑
j=1
(fj(V)− fj(V)) s.t. (6b), (6c)
is also simpler than the SEE optimization problem (6), which can be addressed by a similar
path-following procedure with the QP
max
V
D∑
j=1
Θ
(κ)
j,s (V) s.t. (6b), (12)
solved at the κ−th iteration instead of (16).
9IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
The fixed parameters are: D = 3, N = 12, Nr = 6, Ne = 9, σj ≡ 1, σe = 1, rj ≡ 1 bits/s/Hz,
ζ = 1 and Pc ∈ {7, 10} dB. The secrecy level ǫ = 0.05/ log2 e is set in solving (17). The
channels are Rayleigh fading so their coefficients are generated as CN (0, 1).
For the first numerical example, the number of data streams d1 = 3 is set, so the code rate is
3/12 = 1/4. Each Vj is of size 12× 3. Figure 1 shows the SEE performance of our proposed
beamformer and the zero-forcing beamformer [9], [10]. One can see that the former outperforms
the latter substantially. Apparently, the latter is not quite suitable for both EE and SEE. The SEE
performance achieved by the formulation (6) is better than that achieved by the formulation (17)
because the secrecy level is enhanced with the users’s throughput in the former instead of being
constrained beforehand in the latter. When the transmit power Pmax is small, the denominator of
the SEE objective in (6) and (17) is dominated by the constant circuit power Pc. As a result, the
SEE is maximized by maximizing its numerator, which is the system sum secrecy throughput.
On the other hand, the SEE objective is likely maximized by minimizing the transmitted power
Pmax in its denominator when the latter is dominated by Pmax. That is why the SEE saturates
once Pmax is beyond a threshold according to Figure 1. We increase the number d1 of data
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Fig. 1: Average SEE vs. Pmax for d1 = 3.
streams to 4 in the second numerical example. The code rate is thus 4/12 = 1/3. For this
higher-code-rate case, the zero-forcing beamformers [9], [10] are infeasible. Comparing Figure
10
1 and Figure 2 reveals that higher code-rate beamforming is also much better in terms of SEE
because it leads to greater freedom in designing Vj of size 12× 4 for maximizing the SEE. In
other words, the effect of code rate diversity on the SEE is observed.
0 10 20 30
P
max
 (dB)
0.5
1
1.5
2
A
v
er
a
g
e 
S
E
E
 (
b
p
s/
H
z/
J
o
u
le
)
Proposed Algorithm (6)
Proposed Algorithm (18)
P
c
=7 dB
P
c
=10 dB
Fig. 2: Average SEE vs. Pmax for d1 = 4.
V. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a path-following computational procedure for the beamformer design to
maximize the energy efficiency of a secure MU MIMO wireless communication system and
have also showed its potential in solving other important optimization problems in secure and
energy-efficient communications. Simulation results have confirmed the superior performance of
the proposed method over the exiting techniques.
Acknowledgement. The authors thank Dr. H. H. Kha for providing the computational code
from [10].
APPENDIX
Theorem 1: For a given σ > 0, consider a function
f(X) = ln |Im + (X)2/σ|
in X ∈ Cm×n. Then for any X¯ ∈ Cm×n, it is true that
h(X) ≤ f(X) ≤ g(X) (19)
11
with the concave quadratic function
h(X) = al + 2ℜ{〈X¯XH〉}/σ − 〈Bl, (X)2〉/σ (20)
and the convex quadratic function
g(X) = au + 〈Bu, (X)2〉/σ (21)
where al , f(X¯) − 〈(X¯)2〉/σ, 0  Bl , σ−1Im − (σIm + (X¯)2)−1, and au , f(X¯) + 〈(Im +
(X¯)2/σ)−1 − Im〉, 0 ≺ Bu , (Im + (X¯)2/σ)−1. Both functions h and g agree with f at X¯ .
Proof. Due to space limitations, we provide only a sketch of the proof. Rewrite f(X) = − ln |Im−
(X)2/((X)2 + σIm)
−1|, which is convex as a function in ((X)2, (X)2 + σIm) [18]. Then h(X)
defined by (20) actually is the first order approximation of this function at ((X¯)2, (X¯)2 + σIm),
which is its minorant at ((X¯)2, (X¯)2 + σIm) [17], proving the first inequality in (19).
On the other hand, considering f as a concave function in (X)2, g(X) defined by (21) is seen
as its first order approximation at (X¯)2 and thus is its majorant at (X¯)2 [17], proving the second
inequality in (19).
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